Baloch Freedom Fighters

For decades, Pakistan has engaged in a proxy war against India.  Much of that proxy war has been secretive, while many of those secrets have been exposed.  At other times, Pakistan has made threats of taking war deep inside Indian territory, and Hamid Gul has openly voiced the disintegration of India.  Pakistan's proxy wars have extended from J&K and Punjab to the Northeast regions and the Maoist belt.  Pakistani assistance for the Indian mujahedeen and homegrown Indian terrorists has arrived by way of Nepal, Burma, Bangladesh, infiltration across the LOC in J&K, and infiltration of the Punjab and Rajasthan borders. The smuggling of narcotics into Punjab is accompanied by small arms quickly stockpiled in sleeper cells and mosques across India.  Pakistan is playing towards an endgame; in contrast, India reacts in knee-jerk fashion, rather than catching Pakistani action before the effect, and finds its own plays in Pakistan stymied by an ever-alert ISI.

For years, Pakistan has succeeded in suborning Indian military and government officers and politicians, while India has fallen flat in all such attempts.  And even today, Pakistan finds sympathizers among a very large Indian population that would rather see Muslim and Pakistani rule in India rather than secular Indian rule.  Given this internal shortcoming, India has enemies not only on its borders, but within, as well.  This makes India's task of maintaining its sovereignty all the more difficult.  But fortunately for India, India's massive population serves as a buffer to a lot of that action, thereby serving to mitigate and absorb the forces that would otherwise disintegrate India.  But for India to bank on this strength alone would be unwise, for this bastion can easily break, just as it was broken for the past one thousand years before independence in 1947.

Pakistani has truly bled India by its proxy wars.  Revenue income from J&K and the North East are much lower than potential.  Narcotic distribution by Pakistan in Punjab has resulted in lackluster growth in Punjab's GDP – for decades the most prosperous state in India.  The Maoists have sucked revenue growth in nearly 40% of India's land mass.  That India should grow in real terms at 6% per year is simply amazing given these odds.  What India could do if these hurdles and negative forces were absent would probably be nothing short of a miracle.  It therefore seems appropriate to conclude that Pakistan is coming in the direct way of India's miracle.  Naturally, no rational Indian wants to see Pakistan continue to do so.  Hence, the common Indian further concludes that Pakistan must either be stopped in its destructive actions against India by peaceful action, or be annihilated by force to cease and desist.

The former sees no chance of success: all the diplomacy over decades by the 800-strong Indian Foreign service has yielded nothing more than failures, four wars, and numerous smaller military actions, and daily incursions by Pakistan into India.  This is not what can be called successful Indian diplomacy, no matter how smart the diplomats or what scores they earned in their IAS entrance exams.  The real world of diplomacy consists of grenades and bullets, not roses and choice gardens.  The real world offers injured and dead soldiers and widows, not posh bungalows in Lutyens' Delhi.  The real world sees blood, sweat, heat, cold, and tears in guarding the borders, not air conditioned rooms of rich parliamentarians in central and south Delhi.  It is time to come with the wave, to understand mainstream India, to think like the Indians who earn less than $2 a day – mainstream India – which doesn't get three square meals a day, and is pained to access medical assistance, and dies prematurely largely because there is an enemy that sucks India's resources and kills its people from within.  For Pakistan, it is a very intelligent way to succeed against a larger India; for India, it is the lamb being led to the slaughterhouse.  And because mainstream India continues to carry an ever-increasing yoke, they are slowly turning against the governments that are supposed to look after them.  Long gone is the time when the poor looked upon the government as mai-baap.  The increased alienation of mainstream India from Indian government is a direct threat to India's security and sovereignty.  Aadhar and other such programs are scarcely going to lift the sense of alienation, no matter which government or coalition is at the center.

Thus, in this thesis, the actions that detract from Indian economic growth must be neutralized, and foremost among these is Pakistani proxy wars and interference in India.  So, short of an invasion of Pakistan, an Indian proxy war inside Pakistan must be expanded.  Whereas a proxy war by Pakistan in two Indian provinces merely affects less than 10% of all Indian provinces, a proxy war by India in two Pakistani provinces can affect 40% of Pakistan.  By its sheer size, Pakistani resilience can be less, and Pakistani response to Indian proxy wars can be less effective.  In addition, the effect of proxy wars on the Pakistani economy can be much more to Pakistan than a proxy war on India by Pakistan.  Nevertheless, Pakistan did not learn the lesson that those who live in glass houses should not throw stones.  Pakistan never thought that two could play the game; or else, they thought they could disintegrate India before India woke up.  Well, that was not the case.  India plans to take proxy wars into Pakistani territory, and pay Pakistan back in its own coin.  But let's analyze how a proxy war may succeed within Pakistan.

Requisite Principles of Proxy Wars

As experience around the world has shown, a successful proxy war that is able to disaffiliate a part of a territory or initiate regime change in a country must consider four major parameters:

• The numerical size of the rebel army
• The volume of external aid and military assistance actually provided to the rebels
• The resolve and ability of the home army to resist the armed rebellion
• The physical presence of external military action by a foreign country.

We can study a few examples to illustrate that all the above four must be present in appropriate proportions for the rebellion to succeed.  Requisites 1, 2, and 4 should be as high as possible, while requisite 3 should be as low as possible.

In 1971, the Mukti Bahini had rebels in large numbers, and received a large volume of Indian military supplies, advisors, and Bengali soldiers from the Indian army, thus fulfilling requisites 1 and 2 above.  However, Pakistan had about one corps plus two divisions spread over all parts of Bangladesh to suppress all uprisings in all parts of East Pakistan, thereby demonstrating Pakistani resolve to hold on to East Pakistan, thereby fulfilling requisite 3 above.  But then, as anyone can understand, without Indian military action that invaded East Pakistan, no one thinks that Bangladesh would have been created.  Hence, Mukti Bahini resistance would have been resisted by Pakistani forces till doomsday, even if it meant that the economy would go to ruin and all East Pakistanis would die.  Therefore, the liberation of Bangladesh would have been impossible without direct Indian military intervention.

Look now at how the Americans fought off the Russians in Afghanistan.  The Americans benefitted from a very large numerical rebel force in the shape of the mujahedeen, supplied effective firepower to them, such as the stinger missiles that succeeded in bringing down the vast majority of the Russian helicopter and air fighting fleet, and supplied military and CIA advisors on the ground.  These fulfilled requisites 1 and 2 above.  Russian resolve began to weaken after American weaponry began to take a toll on their military, thereby assuring that requisite 3 did not continue as a major criterion in the rebel action.  Finally, Pakistani forces were lined up along the entire Durand line to offer physical support to the mujahidin, impart physical training and logistics in executing rebel action, and stood as a solid front to dissuade a Russian invasion of Pakistan, while standing as a threat of possibly intervening in Afghanistan should the situation call for it with American blessings.  This requisite 4 was present in this long drawn battle that eventually saw success by the rebels.

Later, in Kosovo, NATO bombing was so devastating and overwhelming that internal resolve to resist was wiped out.  But, even with a small numerical size of the rebel army, the out-of-proportion external military intervention via aerial bombing carried the day, and Kosovo was set on the path of independence.

Look next at Libya: a large rebel base, especially in East Libya, was granted weapons by NATO while CIA advisors guided strategy and tactics on the ground.  American army teams provided clandestine field medical facilities.  The Libyan army had already been reduced to ineffectiveness by Gaddafi because he feared they may launch a coup against him just as he did against King Idris, so the ability of the Libyan army to resist was reduced.  Gaddafi had to procure mercenaries from neighboring Male who had mixed loyalties and so took Gaddafi's money till the going was good, but then abandoned him when the going got tough.  Finally, NATO warplanes such as the Eurofighter and Rafale delivered the coup d'etat to Libyan forces for over weeks of prolonged fighting.  Again, we see that all four requisites in our criteria were present to favorable degrees for the regime change to succeed through a proxy war. 

Now look at Syria: Whereas the Free Syrian Army has a large numerical size, the arms it receives are limited as America refuses to arm them, while Europe is a reluctant supplier.  The resolve of Bashar Assad to resist knows no end; and external intervention is all but missing, with only one or two Israeli air raids into Syria, but that also only to target fissile nuclear material and movement of trucks and machinery required for Syria's clandestine nuclear program.  Hence, it can be observed that Syria's civil war is dragging on slowly and painfully at a rotten pace.  The external ingredient is convincingly missing in the right proportion for the rebel action to succeed convincingly.  Thus, the lesser the external supply and physical action on the ground, the longer the rebel action can be expected to take; if external assistance is stepped up, the Assad regime is likely to crumble faster.

The applications of the requisites are applicable and relevant everywhere.  The Chechen and Sinkiang rebellions have been unsuccessful because there is no external physical action present.  The only armaments they get are from other Islamic groups in Asia, which is of an insufficient and meager amount.  Sinkiang rebels have been trained second hand by mujahidin in Afghanistan and madrasas in Pakistan, a poor substitute for the real training. Similarly, the Mindanao rebels have failed to severe from the Philippines because internal resolve to resist them is high and external actions to intervene are absent.  Gaddafi funded the Mindanao rebels for a long time in the 1990s and 2000s, and their rebel attacks were aggressive during those days, but the situation is apparently contained now because the necessary requisites have further diminished.

In 1979, we saw that the Cambodian populace, unable to overthrow a blood-sucking Pol-Pot, required an actual Vietnamese invasion to overthrow the brutal regime, since no amount of earlier Vietnamese weapon assistance to the rebel armies seemed to suffice.  Overall, it can be noticed all over the world that the principle of the four requisites is applicable and relevant in every proxy war that anyone seeks to fight.

The Principle of Requisites Applied to Pakistan's Proxy Wars in India

Coming now to India, it is seen that Nagaland is still a part of India inspite of the fact that the numerical size of rebels was tangible; they received small arms from outside sources (read: China and Pakistan).  But they underestimated the resolve of successive Indian governments, and there was no external enemy action against Nagaland.  Hence requisite 1 existed; requisite 2 was present to a considerable extent, but not to the fullest extent; and requisites 3 and 4 were absent; the result: proxy wars waged by Pakistan and China in Nagaland have been unsuccessful in severing Nagaland from the Indian union.

Extend this principle to J&K.  Pakistan has tried repeatedly since 1947 to severe J&K from India.  Pakistan has provided small arms, sent its own military personnel to infiltrate Kashmir to create turmoil, has grown a rebel mujahidin army with the help of other terrorist outfits, and has succeeded in destroying the economic base of Kashmir, but has failed to severe Kashmir from India.  India's resolve to hang on to J&K is steadfast, resolute, and non-negotiable.  In addition, India has sent in up to 500,000 troops at one time to control Kashmir.  Moreover, any military action that Pakistan initiates across the Line of Control (LOC) is not sufficient to overpower Indian forces.  Hence, whereas requisites 1 and 2 are present in Kashmir, requisites 3 and 4 are not present in adequate proportions.

The situation with the Maoists has not reached extreme proportions yet.  Perhaps when India has to fight on two-and-a-half fronts, this dimension may pose a problem, but for the present, the Maoist situation, by itself, is missing requisites 3 and 4; requisite 1 is very, very strongly in its favor, and requisite 2 is also existent because the Maoists are known to receive small arms with Chinese markings, unless the allegation is propaganda by Indian counter-intelligence.  Hence, the Maoists can fret and fume from event after event, but they will be unable to secure major advantages till requisites 3 and 4 fall into place, which is why the Maoist problem is still somewhat contained.

Proxy Wars in Pakistan: Baluch Focus

Now, move to Baluchistan, which is the main site of India's proclaimed proxy war in Pakistan.  The British and Americans also have strong interest in creating an independent Baluchistan, not to mention Iran's interest because Baluchistan is predominantly Shia, like Iran.  British Prime Minister Tony Blair apparently put the idea into America's ear that having an independent Baluchistan would solve America's overland route problem into Afghanistan.  The British SIS (or MI6) consequently initiated clandestine action with the CIA post 10/11 to foment rebellion in Baluchistan, once American troops displaced the Taliban from power in Afghanistan.  Hence requisite 2 went into action. The numerical size of the rebels was relatively small when the Western powers started, but that got built to some 4-6,000 rebels, about the size of two brigades, and enough to cause turmoil, blow up army depots, harass military convoys, and launch surprise attacks at military bases.  Seeing an upswing in Baluch rebellion in 2004, Musharraf sent in one division and two brigades to quash the rebellion.  Soon, the octogenarian leader of Baluchistan, Nawab Akbar Bugti, Oxford-educated, and a former Governor of Baluchistan, was assassinated by Musharraf in 2006, who claimed it a victory for the Pakistani people1.  In 2007, the Pakistani army resorted to indiscriminate civilian attacks in the regions of Kahan and Dera Bugti; over 200 houses were razed, and more than 100 civilians, women and children killed. In addition, Pakistani forces poured into more than a dozen cities to suppress pro-independence protests; the army further used helicopter gunships and carpet bombed entire villages in Kahan, Taratani and Kamalan Kech areas. Dozens of Baluch were shot dead in cold blood by executing squads, 400 were arrested, another 500 were kidnapped. The human rights violations were appalling.2

In 2012, nearly 1,000 people were officially known killed in Baluchistan,3 in a province of only 8 million people, even though it occupies 44% of the land area of Pakistan.  The daughter and grand-daughter of Bugti were slaughtered in their car in the streets of Karachi, to send a gruesome message to Bugti's grandson, Brahmadagh, the leader of the Baluch Republican Party.4 It appears that the rebellion is weighted in the opposite direction to what intended: rebel groups and sympathizers are being slaughtered by home security forces rather than the other way around.  Nevertheless, after Musharraf's departure to England, an FIR was issued against him for the murder of Akbar Bugti.  Musharraf will still have to face the music after he returns on March 24, 2013 to Pakistan.

Thus, the uprisings, revolts, and rebellions continue in Baluchistan today.  MI6 and CIA are interested in carving the country of Baluchistan, in which they find themselves as strange bedfellows with Iran, with the same end interest, but for a different reason.  For Iran, it's a question of creating a larger Shia conglomerate; for the Americans and British it is to have an overland route to Afghanistan, as well as have a physical base from where to monitor Pakistani nuclear movements; for India, it is simply a matter to break-up and weaken an arch enemy.  India is assumed to provide assistance to the Baluch, an action that India need not be ashamed of, though Pakistan tried to shame India in this matter in the famous 2009 joint statement between Yousuf Raza Gilani and Manmohan Singh.5  Creating a proxy war in Baluchistan to severe it from Pakistan is in the direct interest of India.  First, the mineral-rich province will then no longer provide resources and riches to Pakistan, an event that will directly deplete Pakistani military expenditure.  While Baluchistan is easily Pakistan's richest province, its people are its poorest, mainly because Pakistan has exploited Baluchistan like a colony.  The human rights excesses by Pakistan in Baluchistan are enough of a moral reason to assist and aid the Baluch in segregating from Pakistan.  But more than that, Pakistan has been enough of an enemy of India to attract India's legitimate and moral wrath.  Finally, Indian covert action in Baluchistan is fair tit-for-tat for Pakistani proxy wars in India.  India should not be left wanting in its own security concerns.  An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth is fair policy.  But India needs to brook no nonsense, and like every other country in its place, has the moral right to react disproportionately: Two eyes for one; and the whole jaw for a tooth!

Brief History of Baluchistan

Baluchistan consists of a western province in Iran, a northern province in Afghanistan, and a central province in Pakistan.  They speak a dialect distantly related to the Kurdish people. Ironically, the Baluch are deprived of a nation just like the Kurds, who are also divided across three countries. In the 19th century, the Persians and British agreed to divide Baluchistan into a Persian sector, an Afghan province, and an independent central state that served as a vassal state to Great Britain,6 much like Kashmir.  These vassal states protected Great Britain from invasions from the West and North, especially considering that they entered into a separate agreement with Russia to keep Afghanistan as a virtual no-man's land.  Thus, Britain's borders to the north and west against the major empires of the time – Russia, Persia, and a potential China were secure.  Tibet was an added buffer against both Russian and Chinese invasions, remembering that Chengiz Khan had come into North India through Tibet and Afghanistan, while Russia had expanded southwards into Central Asia during the major part of the early 19th century.